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31.
ILYA PRIGOGINE STEPHEN HAWKING PIET HUT JOHN POLANYI BILL JOY AMORY LOVINS FRANCIS FUKUYAMA JACQUES ATTALI PETER SLOTERDIJK LEON KASS JAMES WATSON IAN WILMUT CRAIG VENTER DANIEL COHEN WILLIAM HASELTINE GERALD EDELMAN DAVID BALTIMORE JOSHUA LEDERBERG NORMAN BOURLAG JIMMY CARTER PAUL BOYER DANIEL COHN‐BENDIT JAMES HANSEN MARIO MOLINA FARIDA FAOUZIA CHARFI AHMED ZEWAIL ALAIN TOURAINE MUNAWAR ANEES CZESLAW MILOSZ 《新观察季刊》2008,25(1):48-51
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An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory. 相似文献
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PETER JOHN 《Public administration》1996,74(2):293-313
The accession of the UK into the European Community in 1973 and the growth in power and competence of European institutions in subsequent years prompts a rethink of relationships between central and local governance. Rather than a dyadic process between two sets of bodies, the new triadic system is based on varying interactions between the three groups of actors at each level. The article develops six possible scenarios of new relationships which can be simplified into centralization, no change or decentralization. To appraise the nature of the changes, the article examines the operation of the European Regional Development Fund, the additionality controversy, lobbying over the 1994 reform of the structural funds and aspects of environmental regulation. Rather than one scenario dominating, the findings show several types of new relationships emerging. 相似文献
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This article addresses the numerous ways command or coercion is used by the state to enhance law enforcement, ways that involve creative interactions with both the targets of law enforcement and third parties. Coercive measures encompass both mandatory reporting and mandatory action. Examples are given and the benefits of using coercion in such circumstances discussed. However, coercion may also have unintended consequences and impose unreasonable costs. With these effects in mind, the authors suggest a set of guidelines for evaluating the appropriateness of coercive measures. 相似文献